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This paper investigates why financial market experts misperceive the interest
rate policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). Assuming a Taylor–rule–type
reaction function of the ECB, we use qualitative survey data on expectations
about the future interest rate, inflation, and output to discover the sources of in-
dividual interest rate forecast errors. Based on a panel random coefficient model,
we show that financial experts have systematically misperceived the ECB’s in-
terest rate rule. However, although experts tend to overestimate the impact of
inflation on future interest rates, perceptions of monetary policy have become
more accurate since clarification of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy in May
2003. We find that this improved communication has reduced disagreement over
the ECB’s response to expected inflation during the financial crisis.
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1 Introduction
Central bank communication is increasingly important to both central banks and fi-
nancial market participants, see Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, DeHaan, and Jansen
(2008). Effective communication should ensure that financial markets understand the
central bank’s interest rate policy, i.e., how interest rate decisions are linked to future
inflation and output. However, central bank communication is not always effective
and interest rate forecast errors can, and do, occur for two reasons. First, forecasters
may indeed understand monetary policy but misperceive future interest rate decisions
simply because they are wrong about future inflation and output. Second, the fore-
casters actually do not understand monetary policy and the interest rate rule applied
by the central bank. In this case, communication should be improved because mar-
kets will misperceive interest rate decisions even under perfect information about the
economic outlook. This paper employs survey data on financial market expectations
about future interest rates, inflation, and output in the Euro area to shed more light on
communication by the European Central Bank (ECB), disagreement among financial
experts over future interest rate decisions, and the sources of policy misperception.
Our analysis employs individual interest rate forecasts by financial market experts
taken from the Financial Market Survey conducted by the Centre for European Eco-
nomic Research (ZEW). This is a monthly survey and comprises a rich set of quali-
tative expectations as to short–term interest rates, inflation, and output. Assuming
that experts use Taylor–rule–type forecast equations for short–term interest rates, we
explore whether interest rate forecast errors are driven by uncertainty about the fu-
ture course of inflation and output or whether experts are confused about monetary
policy rules. In particular, we assess the consequences of a major change in ECB
communication that occurred in May 2003, at which time the ECB provided a more
precise definition of price stability (inflation should be below but close to 2%) and
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deemphasized the role of monetary aggregates for short–term policy decisions. Since
then, the ECB’s monetary analysis puts more emphasis on the long–term relation-
ship between money supply and inflation. We also investigate whether the market’s
understanding of monetary policy has been affected by the recent economic crisis.
A great deal of research confirms the predictive content of survey data for macroe-
conomic variables, see e.g. Mitchell and Pearce (2007) and Dreger and Stadtmann
(2008), who study the forecasting performance of the Wall Street Journal’s panel of
economists. Survey data on expectations are increasingly used in the literature to eval-
uate central bank communication. For example, Capistra´n and Ramos-Francia (2010)
and Ehrmann, Eijffinger, and Fratzscher (2010) explore how the introduction of infla-
tion targeting affects the dispersion of inflation expectations in surveys. Lange, Sack,
and Whitesell (2003), Swanson (2006), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007), and Sturm
and de Haan (2009) show that more transparent communication generally improves
market participants’ predictions of the central bank’s interest rate decisions.
All these contributions focus on the size and other statistical properties of individual
forecast errors; no attempt is made to explain why interest rate forecast errors are
made. Work by Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009) is closest in spirit to the
approach we undertake here. These authors investigate the role of geography, i.e., the
forecaster’s location, in interest rate forecast error. By estimating Taylor–rule–type
relationships for each forecaster separately, they decompose forecast errors as being ei-
ther systematic or unsystematic. We extend Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009)
in that our analysis of financial market experts’ interest rate forecast errors includes
information from the individual forecasts about inflation and output. Moreover, be-
cause we estimate a panel random coefficient model that allows for a dispersion of the
estimated coefficients, our empirical approach can estimate the disagreement between
financial experts over monetary policy strategy.
Our empirical results confirm that both the ECB and financial market experts use
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inflation as a Taylor rule argument. However, financial experts tend to overestimate
the ECB’s interest rate reaction to inflation. The ECB’s attempt to clarify its mon-
etary policy strategy in 2003 actually improved communication regarding the role of
inflation. However, disagreement among experts about the central bank’s reaction to
output growth has increased since the beginning of the financial crisis, suggesting that
financial market experts have difficulty assessing the ECB’s strategy with respect to
output fluctuations.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the ZEW financial market
survey data and briefly discusses how recent work has used the aggregate survey
balance statistics versus the individual survey expectations. Section 3 derives and
decomposes interest rate forecast errors from a standard Taylor rule. Section 4 presents
the econometric model, Section 5 sets out the empirical results on misperception of
the ECB interest rate policy; Section 6 concludes.
2 Survey Data on Expectations
2.1 The ZEW Financial Market Survey
2.1.1 The Data Set
Since December 1991, the ZEW has been asking approximately 350 financial sector
professionals about their expectations regarding a large set of macroeconomic vari-
ables, such as inflation, output, and interest rates. These professionals, or ”financial
market experts,” usually have an academic background in economics and are also
engaged in observing economic developments so they should be highly qualified for
forecasting economic developments. Most of them work at banks (60%); the rest are
employed by the insurance industry (10%), financial departments of industrial compa-
nies (11%), or by other financial service providers. A majority (88%) of these financial
market experts are employed in Germany, 10% are located within the European region,
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and 2% are from non-European countries.
Usually during the first two weeks of a month, the financial market experts are asked
whether they expect short–term interest rates to decrease (-1), stay constant (0), or
to increase (1) within the next six months. Specifically, the experts are asked for
their predictions of the three–month interbank rate, i.e., the three–month Euribor in
the Euro zone, which is very closely related to the ECB’s policy rate. In particular,
assuming equal qualitative changes of the Euribor and the ECB’s policy rate is em-
pirically well established, see e.g. Nautz and Offermanns (2007). Further questions
asked that are relevant to this study concern changes in the annual inflation rate and
the economic situation in the Euro zone. We evaluate the experts’ answers to these
questions with respect to the six–month change in HICP inflation and the six–month
growth rate of industrial production, respectively.1 Table 4 in the Appendix provides
descriptive statistics on the individual survey expectation data, Table 5 the detailed
survey questions. Figure 1 in the Appendix gives a graphical illustration of the HICP
inflation rate and the six–month growth rate of industrial production.
The ZEW publishes aggregate balance statistics, defined as the difference between
the relative share of answers falling into the categories ”increase” and ”decrease.” In
contrast, our analysis uses the individual, qualitative assessments of the experts. Of
the 350 experts questioned each month, on average, about 300 answer. Thus, we base
the estimation on an unbalanced panel of around 300 observations each month. For a
sample period from January 2000 to March 2009, this gives us 32,072 observations.
2.1.2 The Forecasting Performance of Aggregate Balance Statistics
The forecasting performance of the ZEW survey expectations is detailed in the lit-
erature. Breitung and Jagodzinski (2001) and Hu¨fner and Schro¨der (2002) find that
the ZEW Economic Sentiment Indicator, the survey’s aggregate balance statistic of
1We prefer industrial production to GDP data because only the former are available on a monthly
basis.
4
output growth expectations for Germany, has good forecasting quality. The fore-
casting power of inflation and short–term interest rate balances is tested by Nolte
and Pohlmeier (2007). The authors discuss a VAR–based forecasting approach and
quantification methods that transform the shares of positive and negative assessments
from the survey into a quantitative variable, see Carlson and Parkin (1975), and on
the regression approach Pesaran (1984). Similar to the evidence available for e.g. the
Wall street journal survey, Nolte and Pohlmeier (2007) find that the ZEW survey
forecasts are unbiased and that their predictive power is comparable to a random
walk. Furthermore, they find no support for the hypothesis that experts’ forecasting
quality depends on subgroups. Ullrich (2008) quantifies the aggregate shares of infla-
tion expectations by means of the Carlson–Parkin method and shows that they are
significantly influenced by ECB rhetoric. Her findings suggest that financial market
experts keep a sharp eye on ECB communication. These papers have in common
that they work with the aggregate balance statistics and do not consider individual
heterogeneity.
2.1.3 Heterogeneous Forecasters
When exploring the expectation formation process, one should account for the het-
erogeneity of forecasters, which can be done in several ways. For the Wall Street
Journal’s panel of economists, Mitchell and Pearce (2007) classify the participants ac-
cording to subgroups depending on industry or experience. For the same survey panel,
Dreger and Stadtmann (2008) show that the heterogeneity in exchange rate forecasts
cannot be explained by individual forecasts of macroeconomic variables in the survey
context. A more sophisticated way to model forecasters’ heterogeneity is proposed by
Rangvid, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2009). They estimate a panel random coefficient
model for the stock market expectations of participants in the ZEW financial market
survey. In the following, we adopt the random coefficient approach where forecasters’
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heterogeneity is reflected in the distribution of estimated coefficients.
2.2 Individual Interest Rate Forecasts and Taylor Rules
Most of the relevant literature evaluating the accuracy of forecasts makes no attempt
to explain the sources of interest rate forecast errors. In an exception to this trend,
Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009) employ a Taylor rule model to investigate
interest rate forecast errors of professional ECB policy forecasters. They use quantita-
tive survey data from a Reuters poll in which financial institutions were asked for the
expected policy rate. Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009) decompose the interest
rate forecast errors (rejt − rt) of forecaster j into a systematic (sj) and an unsystem-
atic (uj) component. The systematic part depends on the individual Taylor–rule–type
forecast equation
rejt − rt = βˆjrrt−1 +
∑
βˆjkxkt + βˆjpip˜ijt − rt + uˆjt = sˆjt + uˆjt.
where xkt are macroeconomic variables and p˜ijt is the inflation differential of the coun-
try in which the forecaster is located, relative to the Euro zone average. Their em-
pirical results indicate that the systematic component matters for forecast accuracy.
In particular, descriptive statistics on average errors suggest that forecasters from
financial centers such as Frankfurt or London provide more accurate forecasts.2
This paper extends Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009) in two important re-
spects. First, since the ZEW financial market survey not only asks for expected
interest rates, but also for expected inflation and output, we can include forward–
looking Taylor rule arguments in each individual interest rate forecast equation, see
Section 3. Second, our econometric framework uses a random coefficient model to ex-
plicitly model the forecasters’ disagreement over appropriate Taylor rule parameters,
see Section 4.
2In a related work, Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2006) show that for the case of anticipating
Fed monetary policy decisions, regional differences within the United States play a significant role.
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3 Forecasting Interest Rates with Taylor Rules
3.1 The Interest Rate Policy of the Central Bank
Ever since Taylor’s (1993) seminal work, reaction functions specified as Taylor rules,
where the central bank determines the key policy rate in response to inflation and
output, have been the predominant way of modeling interest rate setting by central
banks. Starting with Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1998), much empirical work con-
firms that Taylor rules are remarkably adept at describing central bank interest rate
decisions (for recent examples, see Jansen and de Haan (2009); Grammig and Kehrle
(2008)). In accordance with Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009), we assume that
the central bank sets the short–term interest rate in response to contemporaneous
output and inflation:
∆6it = α∆6pit + β∆6yt. (1)
The Taylor rule is defined in terms of sixth differences (∆6) because the qualitative
survey data refer to interest rate changes over six months. From a theoretical point of
view, the output gap should be part of the Taylor rule. However, by taking differences,
potential output drops out of the equation. For many applications, the assumption of
a contemporaneous Taylor rule is not without problems, because reliable data for pit
and yt is typically not available in period t. In our application, however, this is not a
big issue. Because of the high correlation between e.g. ∆6pit and ∆6pit−1 estimations
based on lagged inflation would lead to very similar results. Moreover, the role of
data revisions should be less severe for the qualitative data used in our paper. Most
importantly, however, the contemporaneous Taylor rule takes into account that the
central bank can set its interest rate it based on all information available at time t
while the financial experts’s interest rate forecasts iet are made in period t− 6.
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3.2 Decomposing Individual Forecast Errors
If the central bank follows a Taylor rule, financial market experts may also use a Taylor
rule in formulating their expectations of the central bank decision. Given the survey
horizon of six months, an expert j is expected to form his interest rate expectations






According to Equation (2), the interest rate change expected by expert j depends on
his expected change in inflation ∆6piejt and output ∆6y
e
jt. The interest rate forecast
errors ei∗jt are obtained by subtracting the financial market expert’s forecast (Equation
(2)) from the actually observed interest rate set by the central bank (Equation (1))
ei∗jt = ∆6it −∆6iejt







where the asterisk in ei∗jt is used to be consistent with the latent variable formulation
of the econometric model in Section 4. Equation (3) will be estimated in Section 5. To
derive the financial market experts’ misperception regarding central bank parameters,





jt + (α− αj)∆6pit + (β − βj)∆6yt, (4)
with epijt = ∆6pit−∆6piejt and eyjt = ∆6yt−∆6yejt. Equation (4) shows that the overall
individual interest rate forecast error can be decomposed into two parts. The first part
(αjepijt + βje
y
jt) follows from the error a financial market expert makes in forecasting
inflation and output. The second component ((α− αj)∆6pit + (β − βj)∆6yt) is due to
the analyst’s misperception of how the central bank will react to changes in inflation
and output. The central bank can influence both causes of error. First, it can provide
the public with macroeconomic projections and, second, it can explain how it reacts
to changes in these variables.
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3.3 Qualitative Interest Rate Forecast Errors
The answers of the surveyed experts are qualitative, whereas the actual, observed
data series is continuous. One way of making the two comparable is to transform the
aggregate shares of responses into a quantitative series.3 In our application, where
the focus is on the individual level, it is more appropriate to transform the realized,
quantitative interest rate data into a qualitative variable. To that aim, we transform








1 if ∆6ij < ∆6it
0 if ∆6ij ≤ ∆6it ≤ ∆6ij
−1 if ∆6it < ∆6ij ,
(5)
where ∆6ij and ∆6ij denote individual lower and upper thresholds, which have been
surveyed by a special question in the ZEW survey. Within these—partly asymmetrical—
thresholds, a financial market analyst would continue to say that the underlying
macroeconomic variable will not change. Note that individual thresholds imply that
the qualitative interest rate variable ∆6i
q
jt also depends on the expert.
4 The qualita-
tive interest rate forecast errors eijt of expert j are defined as the difference between
the qualitative change of the interest rate ∆6i
q
jt and the expert’s forecast made in
period t− 6 for the change of i six months ahead ∆6iejt:
eijt = ∆6i
q
jt −∆6iejt; eijt ∈ {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2} (6)
The descriptive statistics on the resulting qualitative interest rate forecast errors,
provided in Table 1, show that the mean value of the forecast error ei is close to
zero. Moreover, the forecast errors are always between -1 and +1, implying that the
directional forecast has always been correct.
3Nardo (2003) critically reviews the prevailing quantification methods. She concludes that they
do not prove superior to the original, qualitative data.
4We use the individual threshold values when they are available and the average thresholds if the
individual threshold is not available.
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Table 1: Qualitative Euro area interest rate forecast errors of experts: Descriptive
statistics
Jan 00 - Oct 03 Nov 03 - Jul 07 Aug 07 - Mar 09
Interest rate forecast errors
µ(eijt) -0.01 -0.38 -0.23
σ(eijt) 0.83 0.60 0.77
Min(eijt) -1 -1 -1
Max(eijt) 1 1 1
Relative frequencies of forecast errors
freq(eijt) = −2 - - -
freq(eijt) = −1 35% 44% 44%
freq(eijt) = 0 31% 49% 35%
freq(eijt) = 1 34% 7% 21%
freq(eijt) = 2 - - -
# obs 14,183 12,758 5,132
Notes: Qualitative interest rate forecast errors of the surveyed inter-
est rate expectations versus the 3–month Euribor as constructed in
Equation (6). freq(eijt) gives the relative frequency of the forecast error
taking the respective value.
4 The Econometric Model
4.1 Panel Random Coefficient Ordered Logit Model
Table 1 shows that the interest rate forecast errors of experts as derived from the
ZEW survey are qualitative variables with three ordered outcomes. To explore the
determinants of the errors, estimating an ordered logit model is a natural choice. We
thus estimate the following econometric model for the latent variable ei∗jt for expert j,
j = 1, ..., N , in month t, t = 0, ..., Tj :







The logit model assumes that εjt are i.i.d. and follow a logistic distribution Φ. The
outcome probabilities P for the observed values ei of the latent variable conditional




as follows, see Wooldridge (2001):
P (eijt = −1|zjt) = P (ei∗jt ≤ 0|zjt) = Φ(−z′jtδj)
P (eijt = 0|zjt) = P (0 < ei∗jt ≤ ς1|zjt) = Φ(ς1 − z′jtδj)− Φ(−z′jtδj) (8)
P (eijt = 1|zjt) = P (ς1 < ei∗jt) = 1− Φ(ς1 − z′jtδj)
where ς1 is a threshold parameter for the probability categories.
To measure dispersion of the forecasting models across the financial market experts,
we estimate a random coefficient model according to Swamy (1970). Under this ap-
proach, we incorporate cross–sectional heterogeneity of the assessments for inflation
and output. Cross–sectional heterogeneity in Equation (7) is introduced via the ran-


















with ξαj , ξ
β
j ∼ N (0, 1). σα and σβ measure the dispersion of the estimated model
coefficients across the financial market experts. Systematic misperception of monetary
policy is present if the mean values α¯ and β¯ deviate significantly from α and β, the
central bank parameters.
4.2 The ECB’s Clarification of the Monetary Policy Strategy
Given the economic interpretation of the mean and dispersion parameters of the ran-
dom coefficient model for the experts’ interest rate forecast errors, we now test whether
these parameters responded to ECB communication or to the financial market crisis.
The ECB made two announcements with respect to monetary policy strategy. In the
first, in October 1998,5 the ECB declared that its strategy would consist of three el-
ements. Price stability, the primary objective, would be achieved with inflation rates
5See ECB press release ”A stability–oriented monetary policy strategy for the ESCB” on October
13, 1998.
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of below 2%. Money would play a prominent role in assessing the risks to price sta-
bility and the outlook for price stability would be based on a broad assessment. In
May 2003,6 the ECB released the second statement on monetary policy strategy. This
communication mainly confirms ECB’s definition of price stability, but specifies more
clearly that inflation rates of less than, but close to, 2% are desirable. At the same
time, by classifying money as a means for cross–checking the risks to price stability,
the role of money in its short–term interest rate policy was de–emphasized.
The ECB has repeatedly emphasized that the May 2003 announcement should be
viewed as a clarification and should not be misinterpreted as a change in its monetary
policy strategy, see, e.g., Berger, de Haan, and Sturm (2010). Accordingly, the ex-
perts’ understanding of monetary policy should have become clearer due to improved
central bank communication. In terms of the econometric model, the mean coeffi-
cients should be closer to the central bank coefficients after the May announcement
and the dispersion parameters should have decreased. Because the ECB explicitly
”confirmed” its strategy and has since emphasized that the announcement was not a
change in policy, in our estimation we assume that the central bank parameters are
constant over time. Similarly, we assume that ECB’s monetary policy strategy did
not change during the financial market crisis. In fact, the ECB has not published
any statements to the contrary. Also, during the financial market crisis, the ECB
motivated interest rate decreases with diminished inflation risks.
5 The Perception of the ECB’s Monetary Policy Rule by
Financial Market Experts: Empirical Results
The estimation results obtained from a panel random coefficient ordered logit model
for the determinants of the qualitative interest rate forecast errors made by financial
market experts are summarized in Table 2. The upper part of the table presents the
6See ECB press release ”The ECB’s monetary policy” on May 8, 2003.
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nonrandom coefficients. In order to explore how the central bank’s communication
and the financial crisis influenced the experts’ perception of the ECB’s monetary pol-
icy, the probably different regimes are captured by dummy variables (DI , DII , DIII).
The lower part of Table 2 sets forth the random coefficients of the financial market
experts, which are shown in terms of the parameter means across experts (α¯, β¯) and
the dispersion measures (σα, σβ).
Table 2: The monetary policy rules perceived by financial experts
Dependent variable: Interest rate forecast errors eijt
Central bank parameter α 0.11
β -0.47
Financial market experts
Jan 2000 - Oct 2003 Nov 2003 - Jul 2007 Aug 2007 - Mar 2009












MSEα 0.28 0.16 0.10
MSEβ 0.16 0.13 0.96
Pseudo R2 0.26 N 473 # obs 32,072







III). γj = γ¯+Λvj . MSEγ = (γ¯−γ)2+σ2γ . All estimated Taylor
rule coefficients presented are significant at the 1-percent level. Estimation by simulated
maximum likelihood with 250 Halton draws.
The positive central bank parameter α for inflation indicates that the probability
of tighter monetary policy increases with inflation. This result is in line with the
ECB’s monetary policy strategy, which clearly emphasizes price stability as its primary
objective. In contrast, the sign of the estimated output parameter β of the central bank
is puzzling because it suggests that positive economic growth makes tighter monetary
policy less likely. For the financial market experts, we interact the explanatory variable
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Table 3: Wald tests on parameter equality
H0 : D = 0 D p-value
Misperception of ECB policy (Expert - ECB coefficient)
Inflation α¯I − α = 0.41 0.00
α¯II − α = 0.28 0.00
α¯III − α = 0.14 0.00
Output β¯I − β = -0.25 0.00
β¯II − β = -0.29 0.00
β¯III − β = 0.73 0.00
Impact of ECB communication in 2003
α¯II − α¯I = -0.13 0.00
β¯II − β¯I = -0.04 0.21
Change in expert’s coefficient due to crisis
α¯III − α¯II = -0.14 0.00
β¯III − β¯II = 1.02 0.02
Notes: Wald statistics refer to the estimated coefficients in Table 2.
with dummy variables such that we obtain three parameter values. Specifically, to
test whether the May 2003 clarification led to greater understanding of the ECB’s
policy, we introduce a dummy variable DII for the period from November 2003, the
first month when expectations from May 2003 were realized, until July 2007. The
dummy variable DI captures the first part from January 2000 to October 2003. In
August 2007, the financial market crisis started and is accounted for by DIII .
According to Table 2, the experts have a significantly positive inflation parameter
in all three subperiods. Table 3 shows the average analyst misperception of central
bank reaction with respect to inflation (α¯−α) and output growth (β¯−β). According
to the corresponding Wald test statistics, the experts significantly overestimated the
central bank’s inflation parameter. The high esteem of inflation for monetary policy
by the financial market experts may partly be due to the fact that around 90 percent
of the survey respondents are German. Since the German Bundesbank was known
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for its strict anit–inflationary policy, German respondents might—in particular at the
beginning of the sample period—have maintained this attitude, see Berger, Ehrmann,
and Fratzscher (2009) for an investigation of the role of geographic differences in the
anticipation of monetary policy decisions.
The ECB’s clarification in 2003 induced a significant change in the analysts’ percep-
tion of ECB policy such that their estimated coefficient is now closer to the ECB’s
coefficient α. Since the financial market crisis, the experts’ inflation parameter has
continued to decrease significantly. This finding implies that in this period the ex-
perts seemed to see less need for the ECB to fight inflation given the severe economic
environment. Whereas (α¯ − α) measures the accuracy of the financial analysts’ ex-
pectations regarding the ”true” value α, σα measures their disagreement. Table 2
shows that disagreement with respect to the inflation parameter is relatively moder-
ate and hardly changes during the entire sample period. In particular, the experts’
disagreement over the ECB’s reaction to inflation does not become stronger during
the financial crisis.
With respect to output growth, the estimated parameters of the financial market
experts are negatively signed until July 2007 and positively signed since August 2007
(see Table 2). The latter finding suggests that financial analysts expected the ECB to
be more supportive of output growth. Indeed, the ECB decreased interest rates from
4% in August 2007 to 1.5% in March 2009. The ECB motivated monetary policy
easing primarily with declining inflationary risks. Table 3 shows that the experts’
assessment of the weight of output growth deviated significantly from the central
bank’s weight in all subperiods. The strongest misperception regarding the ECB’s
reaction to output growth appears during the period of the financial crisis. Until
July 2007, disagreement about the output parameter (σβ) was similar in size to the
dispersion parameter for inflation, but it has increased considerably since the financial
crisis, suggesting a stronger disagreement over the ECB’s reaction to output.
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The mean squared error (MSE) in the third panel of Table 2 represents a summary
impreciseness measure for the experts’ misperception of the ECB’s interest rate policy.
For example, MSEα = (α¯ − α)2 + σ2α accounts in each subperiod for the deviation
of the experts’ average inflation parameter α¯ from the central bank parameter α and
the dispersion σα. Table 2 shows that for inflation, this measure decreases over time,
whereas for the output parameter, the mean squared error is highest since the outbreak
of the financial crisis.
Due to the qualitative nature of the underlying forecasts, the size of the inflation and
output coefficients estimated in our logit model should be interpreted with caution.
Yet, the negative sign of the estimated output coefficient (β¯) is undeniably puzzling.
Interestingly, Hamilton, Pruitt, and Borger (2010) found very similar results in a
recent attempt to estimate the market–perceived monetary policy rule of the US
Federal Reserve over the post 2000 period.7
6 Conclusions
There is a growing consensus among economists and central bankers that expectations
management by the central bank is crucial to effective monetary policy. Because
households and firms are forward looking, central banks affect the economy as much
through their influence on expectations as through any direct effect of their policy
instruments. Therefore, central banks are increasingly interested in how markets
form expectations about future interest rate decisions. If market participants are
confused about the goals and rules of monetary policy, analyzing expectations data
should reveal that individual forecasters systematically misunderstand future interest
rate decisions.
This paper investigated why financial market experts misperceive the interest rate
7In contrast to our study, where the focus in on the disagreement of forecasters, Hamilton, Pruitt,
and Borger (2010) abstracts from the heterogeneity issue and uses data of Fed funds rate futures
contracts and macroeconomic news to estimate an aggregate equation valid for the whole market.
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policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). Assuming a Taylor–rule–type reaction
function of the ECB, we employed qualitative survey data on expectations about the
future interest rate, inflation, and output to discover the sources of forecast error. To
that end, we decomposed the individual interest rate forecast errors of financial experts
into two components. The first part of the error occurs because forecasters are wrong
about future inflation and output, even if they correctly assess the monetary policy
strategy. The second part of the error, however, occurs because markets are confused
about monetary policy, i.e., there is a lack of understanding as to how the central
bank sets interest rates in response to inflation and output. In the case of this second
type of error, communication ought to be improved because markets will misperceive
future monetary policy decisions even under perfect information about the economic
outlook. We estimated the empirical relevance of both components for interest rate
forecast errors using a panel random coefficient model in order to explicitly account
for the heterogeneity and disagreement of forecasters.
Our empirical results suggest that financial experts have systematically misperceived
the ECB’s interest rate rule with respect to both, inflation and output. Most notably
in the early stages of the ECB, experts tended to overestimate the impact of inflation
on future interest rates. Since our sample is dominated by German forecasters, this
finding may be partly explained by the legacy of the strict anti–inflationary policy
of the Bundesbank. Indeed, the perception of the role of inflation for the ECB’s
interest rate policy has improved during time and the estimation results suggest that
improved central bank communication has contributed to this development. We also
find that the disagreement among experts on the ECB’s monetary policy has not
increased during the financial crisis. This may reflect the success of the extensive
communication on the part of the ECB to explain its supplementary monetary policy
measures to the public.
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A.1 More Details about the Data
Table 4: Survey expectations for short–term interest rates, inflation and output in the
Euro area: Descriptive statistics
Jan 00 - Oct 03 Nov 03 - Jul 07 Aug 07 - Mar 09
Expected 6–month change in short–term interest rates
µ(iejt) -0.10 0.52 -0.30
σ(iejt) 0.81 0.55 0.73
freq(iejt) = −1 38% 3% 46%
freq(iejt) = 0 34% 43% 38%
freq(iejt) = 1 28% 55% 16%
Expected 6–month change in inflation
µ(piejt) -0.12 0.21 -0.08
σ(piejt) 0.74 0.65 0.83
freq(piejt) = −1 34% 13% 39%
freq(piejt) = 0 43% 54% 30%
freq(piejt) = 1 22% 34% 31%
Expected 6–month change in output
µ(yejt) 0.40 0.34 -0.39
σ(yejt) 0.65 0.61 0.63
freq(yejt) = −1 9% 7% 47%
freq(yejt) = 0 43% 52% 45%
freq(yejt) = 1 48% 41% 8%
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics of the individual survey
expectations for the Euro zone. The data are qualitative with possible
discrete values {-1,0,1}. freq(xejt) gives the relative frequency that the
corresponding variable takes the value given.
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2000m1 2002m1 2004m1 2006m1 2008m1 2010m1
date
Notes: 3-month Euribor (black line), HICP inflation (dashed line) and six month growth rate of
industrial production (grey line) in the Euro zone.
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A.2 Robustness of Results
To assess the robustness of results, we experimented with a range of alternative spec-
ifications:
1. We used one period lagged sixth differences, i.e. ∆6pit−1 and ∆6yt−1 instead
of the contemporaneous sixth differences ∆6pit and ∆6yt in the central bank
reaction function, because the central bank might not be able to observe the
contemporaneous values in t.
2. We estimated a dynamic version of the model with a lagged endogenous variable,
which explicitly takes account of interest rate smoothing in the Taylor rule.
3. We allowed for correlation of the random parameters, which are assumed to be
non-correlated in the current estimation framework.
4. The monthly frequency of the six–month–horizon survey responses might induce
serial correlation due to overlapping forecast horizons, see Fendel, Lis, and Ru¨lke
(2010). To check whether the results are robust in this sense, we exemplarily
conducted the estimations only for January and June.
5. We estimated the model separately for each sample period, which allows a time-
varying monetary policy rule of the ECB.
In all these variations of our model, the main conclusions concerning the sign and
significance of coefficients are largely unaffected. For brevity, we do not include all
these results in the paper, but they are available from the authors on request.
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Table 5: Description of Variables
Variable Definition
∆6it Change in 3–month Euribor from t− 6 to t
∆6pit Change in annual HICP inflation from t− 6 to t, SA
∆6yt Growth of industrial production from t− 6 to t, SA
Survey expectations Survey question
∆6iejt ”In the medium–term (6 months) the short–term
interest rates (3–month–Interbank rate) will
... increase / no change / decrease”
∆6piejt ”In the medium–term (6 months) the macroeconomic annual
inflation rate will ... increase / no change / decrease”
∆6yejt ”In the medium–term (6 months) the overall macroeconomic
situation will ... improve / no change / worsen”
Definition of subperiods
DI January 2000 to October 2003
DII November 2003 to July 2007
DIII August 2007 to March 2009
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